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 Utilizing General Carl von Clausewitz’s theory of friction in combat, Close on the 
Wind examines wind’s historical influence on early United States naval warfare, 
specifically small scale engagements fought during the Quasi War, First Barbary War, 
and the War of 1812. To accomplish this, the thesis first engages in a scientific discussion 
of wind, concentrating on how it occurs and what forces dictate its velocity and direction. 
The examination goes on to also present the types of wind that period sailing vessels 
encountered, including global, regional, and local patterns, as well as how wind 
influenced the practice of sailing and what period naval captains understood about its 
origins. Employing this scientific understanding, Close on a Wind next investigates 
wind’s impact on a collection of American naval engagements, applying von 
Clausewitz’s concept of friction as a guide. The first examples focus on wind as a force 
of friction that through changes in direction and intensity altered battle dynamics leading 
to delays, hindering movement, allowing escapes, and even inflicting damage upon 
vessels. The second group of examples center on the tactics that American naval captains 
utilized to combat wind friction in battle, concentrating particularly on the weather gage 
and how captains attempted to exploit or negate its advantage. Together, these clashes all 
testify to the power and unpredictability that wind brought to naval engagements 
revealing its importance in shaping the early United States Navy’s battle tactics.
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1 
Introduction 
 For millennia sailing has represented a key role in civilization’s development, 
providing infinitely greater mobility, speed, and carrying capacity in comparison to land 
travel, as well as allowing the projection of military power over vast areas. As a result, 
nations throughout history, including the United States, have sought to control the seas 
and oceans to protect their national interests. In order to utilize this power, one must 
understand one of the natural forces that dominate it, wind. For the early United States 
Navy, wind played a decisive role in its battles, greatly influencing the emerging navy’s 
aggressive fighting style. 
 Over the years numerous books have been published about the Navy and its early 
wars.
1
 These works cover a vast array of themes from traditional military histories and 
                                                 
1
 For works on the Quasi and First Barbary Wars see: Michael A. Palmer, Stoddert’s War: Naval 
Operations During the Quasi-War with France, 1798-1801 (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina 
Press, 1987), Alexander DeConde, The Quasi-War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Undeclared War 
With France. 1797-1801 (New York: Scribner, 1966), Howard P. Nash, The Forgotten Wars: The Role of 
the U.S. Navy in the Quasi War with France and the Barbary Wars (New York: A. S. Barnes, 1968), 
Donald B. Chidsey, The Wars in Barbary: Arab Piracy and the Birth of the United States Navy (New York: 
Crown, 1971), Frank Lambert, The Barbary Wars: American Independence in the Atlantic World (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 2005), Glenn Tucker, Dawn Like Thunder: The Barbary Wars and the Birth of the 
U.S. Navy (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merril, 1963), and Gregory Fremont-Barnes, The Wars of the Barbary 
Pirates: To the Shores of Tripoli the Rise of the US Navy and Marines (Long Island City, NY: Osprey 
Publishing, 2006). For works on the War of 1812 see: Donald R. Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten 
Conflict (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2012), Cecil S. The Age of Fighting Sail: The Story of the 
Naval War of 1812 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1956), Mackay J. Hitsman, The Incredible War of 1812: 
A Military History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), Reginald Horseman, The War of 1812 
2 
biographies to economically and politically oriented studies. Nevertheless, an analysis 
focusing specifically on wind and its influences on the American navy does not exist. 
While wind and its affects are not examined at the micro level, several books do 
recognize wind and its contribution to warfare and naval history. These include John 
Collin’s Military Geography, Harold A. Winters’s collaborative effort Battling the 
Elements, and Alfred W. Crosby’s environmental history Ecological Imperialism. 
                                                                                                                                                 
(New York: Knopf, 1969), John K. Mahon, The War of 1812 (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 
1972), Theodore Roosevelt, The Naval War of 1812; or, The History of the United States Navy During the 
Last War with Great Britain: To Which is Appended an Account of the Battle of New Orleans (New York: 
Haskell House, 1968), James Barnes, Naval Actions of the War of 1812 (London: Cornmarket Press, 1969), 
and Jon Latimer, 1812: War with America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007). For  
biographies of important U.S. naval commanders consult: Eugene S. Ferguson, Truxtun of the 
Constellation: The Life of Commodore Thomas Truxtun, U.S. Navy, 1775-1822 (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1956), Linda M. Maloney, The Captain from Connecticut: The Life and Naval Times of 
Isaac Hull (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1986), Claude G. Berube and John Rodgaar, A Call to 
the Sea: Captain Charles Stewart of the USS Constitution (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005), A.J. 
Langguth, Union 1812: The Americans Who Fought the Second War of Independence (New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 2006), and David F. Long’s biographies: Nothing Too Daring: A Biography of Commodore 
David Porter, 1780-1843 (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 1970), Ready to Hazard: A Biography of 
Commodore William Bainbridge, 1774-1833 (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1981), and 
Sailor-Diplomat: A Biography of Commodore James Biddle, 1783-1848 (Boston: Northeastern University 
Press, 1983). Finally, for works providing a overarching view of the U.S. Navy’s creation see: Allan R. 
Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America 
from 1607 to 2012 (New York: Free Press, 2012) and Ian W. Toll, Six Frigates: The Epic History of the 
Founding of the U.S. Navy (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006). 
3 
Military Geography describes the effect that a wide variety of geographic 
features, both physical and cultural, have on warfare. As for wind, Collin’s work focuses 
mostly on the macro scale, discussing wind’s influence on surface water (waves), types 
of winds, and storms. When he does bring attention to the micro level he has few 
examples and they portray wind as a negative force that impedes movement and can 
endanger ships.
2
 In contrast, the work done by Harold A. Winters and his compatriots 
undertakes a much greater micro level examination of the environment’s impact on 
warfare. In its chapter discussing wind and weather, Battling the Elements centers its 
research on three examples: thirteenth-century Japan and the Kamikaze, the Allied 
evacuation of Dunkirk in 1940, and the Normandy invasion in 1944. In doing so Winters 
displayed instances in history in which wind and weather played a critical role in a 
battle’s outcome, acting both negatively (the Kamikaze) and positively (Dunkirk and 
Normandy). However, even in examining wind’s part in these historical events, Battling 
the Elements still does not dig deep enough, lacking an analysis of wind tactics in battle.
3
 
 Perhaps the best written works characterizing wind and applying its influence to a 
specific time period comes from the environmental history Ecological Imperialism. 
Alfred W. Crosby explains how Europe’s environment allowed its people during the age 
of exploration to conquer and colonize regions around the world and turn them into what 
                                                 
2
 John M. Collins, Military Geography: For Professionals and the Public (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s 
Inc., 1998). 
3
 Harold A. Winters, Gerald E. Galloway Jr., William J. Reynolds, and David W. Rhyne. Battling the 
Elements: Weather and Terrain in the Conduct of War (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2001). 
4 
he called “Neo-Europes.”4 In his chapter on wind, Crosby explains how Europeans 
exploited specific global wind patterns through new sailing technologies and techniques, 
opening up the world to European domination. Yet, because Crosby does not investigate 
wind’s influence over naval engagements, he leaves out a significant share of wind’s 
influencing capability. 
In addition to the secondary sources, primary sources played a significant part in 
providing information, helping to uncover the significance that wind played in the 
American Navy’s early battles. Sources such as ship’s logs, captain’s letters, and journals 
offered key information detailing wind conditions like strength and direction, as well as 
giving a timeline for each naval encounter. By far the most helpful primary source 
material came from Abel Bowen’s The Naval Monument.5 Published in 1830 as a 
collection of letters, ship’s log entries, journals, and other firsthand accounts covering the 
American naval engagements fought during the War of 1812, Bowen’s work furnished 
accounts for many of the battles examined in this thesis. 
To detail the relationship between wind and the American navy, this thesis 
defined two parameters to narrow its focus. First, the time frame concentrates on the 
Quasi War, First Barbary War, and the War of 1812. Together, these three wars 
characterized the United States Navy’s birth (Quasi War), growth (First Barbary War), 
and maturation (War of 1812), as well as provided numerous examples detailing 
                                                 
4
 Alfred W. Crosby, Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900-1900 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986), 2. 
5
 Abel Bowen, ed., The Naval Monument, Containing Official and Other Accounts of All the Battles Fought 
Between the Navies of the United States and Great Britain During the Late War; and an Account of the 
War with Algiers (Boston: George Clark, 1830). 
5 
American naval battles and tactics from which to examine wind’s influence. While each 
war contributed conflicts for the study, the majority come from the War of 1812, not 
because it was more important, but because the war was simply more expansive than the 
others. 
 Second, to best explain wind’s influence on specific battles and American naval 
tactics, this paper also limits the engagement types examined to individual, ship on ship 
encounters, and other small engagements. This is done for two reasons. First, due to its 
limited size, the United States Navy lacked the ability to form large fleets or taskforces, 
instead sending its frigates out individually or on patrol with a smaller sloop or brig. 
Consequently, almost every battle fought by the American navy was either single combat 
or a small engagement featuring four or fewer total vessels. Second, determining the 
conditions under which a battle occurred and understanding the actions taken by each 
side is far easier in a small engagement making an examination of wind clearer. 
 Following these constraints, the analysis that arises breaks down wind’s impact on 
the early United States Navy into four chapters. Chapter one presents background for the 
Quasi War, First Barbary War, and War of 1812 briefly describing how the war began, 
what occurred during the war, and how it ended. Chapter two concentrates on wind itself, 
expounding on how wind forms, which forces determine its strength and direction, what 
types of wind exist, how it affects sailing, and what knowledge period captains possessed 
on how wind occurred, specifically if this knowledge was based on scientific 
understanding, collective knowledge accumulated over their careers, or a combination of 
both . The final two chapters illustrate specific examples spelling out wind’s influence on 
the country’s early naval battles. Utilizing General Carl von Clausewitz’s concept of 
6 
friction, chapter three demonstrates the direct role that wind played in deciding several 
naval engagements. Lastly, chapter four continues along these lines, expanding wind’s 
influence to tactics, particularly focusing on exploiting or countering the weather gage. 
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Overhead View of the Spar Deck 
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Chapter 1: War Backgrounds 
With America’s war for independence over, the young country now faced the 
growing challenge of defending not only its thousands of miles of coastline, but also its 
economic and political interests on the world stage. At the eighteenth century’s close, this 
meant navigating through the complex world of international politics, negotiating 
alliances and treaties, as well as possessing a navy to protect the nation’s trade and 
transmit its political and military influence to any belligerent’s doorstep. In the United 
States’ case though, such a navy did not exist to give teeth to any negotiated agreement. 
By 1785, the Confederation government had sold the Continental Navy’s remaining 
vessels and greeted any talk of resurrecting the institution with political infighting over 
the cost and danger of provoking a European power to war.
6
 Necessity soon changed 
such opinions though, as a series of wars, the Quasi War, the First Barbary War, and the 
War of 1812, made it clear that the country badly needed a navy. 
 
Quasi War 
The Quasi War’s roots trace back to 1793 when the French Revolution’s violence 
boiled over into a worldwide conflict between France and Britain. Politically split over 
whom to support, Congress and the Washington administration ushered in a policy of 
neutrality.
7
 While the policy’s primary aim sought to prevent the country from becoming 
a pawn for the world’s great powers, many opportunistic American merchants saw the 
                                                 
6
 Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States 
of America (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 99-100. 
7
 Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 100-101. 
10 
policy as an irresistible money-making opportunity. As the war escalated and prolonged, 
Britain and France’s shipping proved unable to handle the war’s increasing demands, in 
addition to each country’s normal trade. As a result, Britain and France turned heavily to 
neutral countries, particularly the United States, to carry their goods and provide 
supplies.
8
  
With the war raging, the nation’s merchants stepped in to fill the void, greatly 
increasing the United States imports, exports, and ship tonnage engaged in foreign trade. 
However, the new-found commercial power did not come without danger. As America’s 
commercial importance grew, both Britain and France attempted to curtail the nation’s 
neutrality in order to cut off their enemy’s trade and possibly draw the country into the 
war. To walk the fine line between the two belligerents, American diplomats needed to 
demonstrate their astuteness and lessen the tension that surrounded the United States.
9
 
America’s first peace overture went toward its traditional enemy. In 1794 
President George Washington sent a diplomatic mission to Great Britain, headed by 
statesman John Jay. One year later, Jay’s Treaty achieved its goal, greatly lessening 
tension between the two countries.
10
 While Jay’s Treaty effectively ended the threat of 
war with Britain for the time, it did the opposite with France. A key ally during the 
Revolutionary War, France viewed Jay’s Treaty as a stab in the back, making an already 
strained relationship even more tenuous. The French responded to what they saw as a 
                                                 
8
 Michael A. Palmer, Stoddert’s War: Naval Operations During the Quasi-War with France, 1798-1801 
(Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1987), 4. 
9
 Palmer, Stoddert’s War, 3-4. 
10
 Palmer, Stoddert’s War, 4. 
11 
new Anglo-American alliance by increasing their attacks on American merchant ships 
and refusing to accept a new American minister.
11
  
By September 1800, French privateers and corsairs had seized, captured, detained, 
and confiscated the cargos and crews of  2,309 American merchant ships costing millions 
of dollars. In a final effort to prevent war, President John Adams sent American 
statesmen Elbridge Gerry, John Marshall, and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney to France to 
negotiate a settlement between the two nations. However, before agreeing to a meeting, 
French agents, code named X, Y, and Z by the American diplomats, demanded a two 
hundred and twenty thousand dollar bribe. Gerry, Marshall, and Pinckney refused and, 
when an official letter describing the encounter reached the United States, anti-French 
sentiments over what came to be known as the X Y Z Affair swept through American 
society.
12
 With diplomacy failing to stop France from harassing American commerce, a 
military response became President Adams’ only reasonable option. The United States 
sent out its new naval force consisting of fifty-four warships, including the six frigates 
authorized by Congress in 1794 that came on line during the conflict. Additionally, over 
one thousand armed merchantmen also joined in the hunt for French privateers and 
escorted American merchant vessels, inaugurating a nearly three-year limited and 
undeclared naval war with France.
13
 
                                                 
11
 Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 101. 
12
 Palmer, Stoddert’s War, 6. 
13
 Frigate names and completion dates: United States (10 May 1797), Constellation (7 September 1797), 
Constitution (21 October 1797), Congress (15 August 1799), Chesapeake (2 December 1799), and 
President (10 April 1800), obtained from: “The Reestablishment of the Navy, 1787-1801 Historical 
Overview and Select Bibliography,” Naval Historical Center, 
12 
 The United States Navy’s first conflict came to an end in late 1800 with the 
Treaty of Mortefontaine’s signing.  In less than a year though, the nation’s navy faced 
another challenger on the high seas. Like the Quasi War, the new conflict revolved 
around protecting America’s right to conduct international trade. However, the threat did 
not come from the traditionally powerful European naval states, such as France or 
Britain, but instead came from the Barbary pirates. 
 
First Barbary War 
 Located on North Africa’s coast, the Barbary States occupied a nearly two-
thousand mile long corridor, extending from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Atlantic 
Ocean and consisting of four principal states: Tripoli in the east, and Tunis, Algiers, and 
Morocco in the west. As far back as historical records go, piracy was a highly lucrative 
business for peoples living around the Mediterranean Sea. In the classical era, many of 
Greece’s greatest heroes and leaders, from Achilles and Odysseus to Alexander the 
Great’s father Philip of Macedon either engaged in or utilized piracy to achieve their 
goals. However, after Rome’s fall and the resulting collapse in sea trade, piracy in the 
Mediterranean stagnated. Not until the Renaissance did a trade revival re-open the door 
for pirating, allowing North Africa’s Muslim inhabitants to gain a foothold in the 
business. During the centuries that followed, the Barbary States increased their power, 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.history.navy.mil/biblio/biblio4/biblio4a.htm; and Millett and Maslowski, For the Common 
Defense, 102-103. 
13 
using piracy to blackmail European nations into making large tribute payments to protect 
their nation’s commerce.14 
 Prior to independence, the American colonies’ foreign commerce rested securely 
under a protective umbrella provided by Britain’s commercial treaties and powerful 
Royal Navy. One such treaty, the 1682 treaty of Peace and Commerce negotiated by King 
Charles II with the Algerian Dey, provided protection for all English subjects and their 
ships. This ensured their rights to freely enter and leave Algerian ports, buy and sell 
goods, travel the seas without searches, and protection from enslavement. With American 
independence though, this protection disappeared, making the United States just another 
country for the Barbary States to extort.
15
 
Efforts to rectify the nation’s commercial vulnerability began at the same time as 
the end of the Revolutionary War. In addition to the treaty recognizing independence, the 
United States also submitted a commercial treaty to the British hoping to extend the 
commercial protections that America experienced as British colonies, thus protecting the 
new nation’s commerce from the Barbary States. However, because Great Britain still 
practiced a closed mercantilist economic system, Parliament refused to ratify the 
proposed commercial treaty. From the mid 1780s to the early 1790s, America’s problem 
with the Barbary pirates grew as its merchant ships and their crews began to fall to 
Algerian pirate vessels.
16
 With tensions rising, the United States government undertook a 
                                                 
14
 Donald Barr Chidsey, The Wars in Barbary: Arab Piracy and the Birth of the United States Navy (New 
York: Crown Publishers, 1971), 1, 10-12. 
15
 Frank Lambert, The Barbary Wars: American Independence in the Atlantic World (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 2005), 4-5. 
16
 Lambert, The Barbary Wars, 5-7. 
14 
two-pronged strategy to address the Algerian problem, one military and the other 
diplomatic. The strategy’s military aspect came into existence in 1794 when Congress 
passed the Naval Act, mandating the construction of six frigate class warships to protect 
American merchant vessels. The diplomatic aspect came to fruition two years later with a 
successfully negotiated Algerian peace treaty. President Washington and Congress agreed 
though to continue construction on three frigates to protect against future aggression 
against American maritime commerce.
17
 
The 1796 Algerian treaty and other previous negotiated treaties ended Barbary 
pirate attacks against United States merchant ships, but it cost the country significantly. 
Nearly one million dollars in currency along with an additional twenty-one thousand 
dollars in naval stores went annually to the Algerians alone, this at a time when it cost 
less than six million dollars to run the country for a year.
18
 Nevertheless, even with such 
payments, the Barbary States’ greed still posed a threat. In 1801 the threat materialized 
when the Pasha of Tripoli violated his 1796 treaty with the United States, threatening to 
unleash his pirates if payments did not increase. Refusing to give in to such intimidation, 
President Thomas Jefferson sent a small squadron under Commodore Richard Dale to the 
Mediterranean to defend American merchant vessels and to punish the Pasha for 
threatening war. Over the next four years, United States naval squadrons conducted 
operations against Tripoli, blockading and bombarding the city until June 1805 when a 
peace treaty ended America’s second naval war.19 
                                                 
17
 Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 99. 
18
 Chidsey, The Wars in Barbary, 30-31. 
19
 Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 104-105. 
15 
With the peace treaty signed and the First Barbary War concluded, the United 
States hoped for an extended period of peace and economic prosperity, during which 
America’s merchantmen could freely ply the seas carrying the world’s goods. However, 
the peace and prosperity created after the war’s end proved short lived. Less than ten 
years later, the United States became involved in its most destructive war since the 
Revolution with its traditional and most powerful rival, Great Britain. 
 
War of 1812 
The United States’ next confrontation with the British Empire traces its source 
back to 1803 and the failed Peace of Amiens, which rekindled the Napoleonic War. Much 
as they had done during the Quasi War, Britain and France began targeting neutral 
American merchant ships with the intent to destroy one another’s economies. By this 
point in the war though, the French navy embodied a mere shadow of its former self, 
having lost many ships and command of the sea to the Royal Navy at the Battle of 
Trafalgar. As a result, the economic damage inflicted upon the United States by the 
British far outstripped that caused by the weakened French. From 1803 to 1807, the 
Royal Navy lingered off America’s coast imposing a near blockade, detaining more than 
five hundred American ships and impressing (forcibly taking) American sailors suspected 
to be British deserters and putting them into service aboard British warships.
20
  
With more and more sailors being taken from American ships, impressment soon 
became an increasingly critical issue between the two countries. The worst of these 
offenses occurred on June 22, 1807, when the fifty-two gun frigate HMS Leopard 
                                                 
20
 Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 105. 
16 
intercepted the American frigate Chesapeake off the Virginia Capes with orders to search 
the ship for British deserters. In the melee that followed, the Leopard fired three 
broadsides into the unprepared Chesapeake, killing four and wounding seventeen 
crewmembers. After the American ship struck colors the British boarded it and took four 
deserters back to the Leopard. The disgraced Chesapeake limped back to its anchorage at 
Hampton Roads, Virginia. Word of the incident spread quickly causing waves of public 
outrage to sweep across the nation leading to anti-British sentiment not seen since the 
Revolution.
21
 
The open sea was not the only area where differences between the two countries 
caused increased animosity. In the western states and territories, many American settlers 
pointed to British interference as the reason behind the rising tensions with Native 
Americans in the region. Since signing Jay’s Treaty British officials walked a tight rope, 
seeking to restrain Native American reactions to the increasing numbers of whites 
moving into their territory while maintaining their loyalty through economically 
subsidizing each tribe. However, when hostilities broke out, Americans saw the economic 
and diplomatic connection between the British and the Indians, translating it into blame 
for the uprisings. In 1805 tensions began boiling over when the Shawnee spiritual leader 
Tenskwatawa, known as the Prophet, pioneered a new religious movement that rejected 
the “white man’s ways.” After three disastrous land cession treaties in 1809, the 
Prophet’s brother, Tecumseh, added a militant tone to the movement in order to protect 
against further white encroachment on native lands. 
                                                 
21
 Ian W. Toll, Six Frigates: The Epic History of the Founding of the U.S. Navy (New York: W.W. Norton 
& Company, 2006), 294, 297-99. 
17 
As Tecumseh’s movement spread across the West, Americans began to see it as a 
growing threat. Responding to the danger, the governor of the Indiana Territory, William 
Henry Harrison, assembled a 1,000 strong army to attack and destroy the tribal 
headquarters at Prophetstown. Early on November 7, 1811, Harrison’s forces attacked the 
camp, eventually driving the Indians from Prophetstown. Rather than resolve the conflict 
though, the American victory at the Battle of Tippecanoe forced many more natives 
toward the British, which stoked American hatred and led many to advocate invading 
British Canada.
 22
 
The War of 1812 formally began on June 18
th
 when President James Madison 
signed into law the most hotly debated declaration of war in American history. To this 
day, scholars continue to debate why the United States ventured down the path to war. 
Some point to maritime issues such as impressment, the Orders in Council, which 
imposed broad trade regulations over the European continent and hindered American free 
trade, and British violations of American territorial waters as the war’s primary flash 
points. Others key upon America’s western interests, such as conquering Canada to 
expand the country’s farm land and end British influence in North America, particularly 
over native tribes that opposed American encroachment onto their lands. Still, an 
additional group directs their attention toward political motives, such as building 
Republican Party unity, and ideological dynamics centered on preserving national honor. 
Because so many differing regional and national motives defined the conflict, no single 
                                                 
22
 Donald R. Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 
2012), 22-25. 
18 
issue pinpoints the reason America declared war on Great Britain.
23
 Instead, the war’s 
most likely cause seems a combination of these issues. 
Throughout the war the United States faced repeated setbacks, failing to 
accomplish many of its war aims, and achieved victories only under the most desperate 
circumstances. On land, American forces proved not only unable to capture British 
Canada, but also to protect their own borders, losing parts of New York, northern Maine, 
and large regions west of Lake Michigan, as well as allowing the British to sack and burn 
the nation’s capital.24 Only a small number of victories, such as those at Lake Erie, Fort 
McHenry, and Plattsburg, prevented the British from retaking much of the country. On 
the sea, Britain’s superior naval forces imposed a blockade that devastated the American 
economy. The United States did achieve several stunning victories in frigate-on-frigate 
engagements early in the war. However, the Royal Navy soon countered, ordering its 
warships to avoid one-on-one engagements, increasing the blockade force, and confining 
America’s frigates to port for extended periods. For the war’s remainder, the United 
States Navy depended on its smaller warships that could slip through the blockade and 
attack enemy merchant traffic and small warships, achieving some success.
 25
 Though 
significant to the country’s morale, in the end America’s naval victories had little 
strategic importance, failing to dislodge the British blockade.
 
Even with all their 
successes, the British were content to maintain the pre-war status quo in the treaty that 
ended the war. Signed on Christmas Eve 1814, the Treaty of Ghent officially ended the 
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War of 1812 and returned “all territory, places, and possessions whatsoever taken by 
either party from the other during the war, or which may be taken after the signing of this 
Treaty” to its status quo antebellum.26 
Together, these wars not only supplied the conflicts responsible for creating the 
United States Navy, but also provided the navy with valuable experience from which to 
establish a tactical doctrine. This furnished the basis from which the world’s future 
foremost maritime power developed.
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Chapter 2: Wind, a Scientific Explanation 
How Wind Occurs 
Before delving into the examples that detail the role wind played in influencing the 
United States Navy’s development, a basic understanding of how wind occurs, what forces 
influence it, the types of wind that impact sailing, and how wind affects not only the 
practice of sailing but the environment in which sailing ships operate will illustrate the 
complexities that early nineteenth-century mariners faced. In its simplest definition, wind 
represents the convection driven movement of air from high pressure areas to low pressure 
areas, which originate from the sun’s unequal distribution of heat energy over the earth’s 
surface. Due to the earth’s tilt, some areas receive more heat energy than other locations. 
As the air in areas that receive large amounts of heat energy warms, such as in the 
equatorial region, it becomes less dense and rises, creating a low-pressure zone. 
Conversely, the air in locations that receive smaller amounts of the sun’s energy cools, 
such as in the polar regions, becoming denser and sinking toward the earth’s surface, 
forming a high-pressure zone.
 1
   
Due to the pressure difference, the high pressure zone’s cooler, denser air flows 
along the earth’s surface toward the low pressure zone, seeking to fill the partial vacuum 
caused by the rising warm air and producing a surface wind. Along the way and upon 
reaching the low pressure zone, the cooler, denser air warms and rises into the atmosphere. 
Similarly, higher up in the atmosphere the low pressure zone’s warmer, less dense air flows 
toward the partial vacuum left by the high pressure zone’s sinking dense air, cooling along 
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the way and then sinking towards the surface. These moving air masses create a convection 
driven atmospheric cell, which will continue to produce winds on the surface and in the 
upper atmosphere as long as the two differing pressure zones exist.
2
 
 
 
 
 
Forces that Influence Wind 
While pressure differences caused by the sun’s unequal distribution of solar heat 
energy represent the driving force that produces wind, other factors influence the wind’s 
direction and speed. These include the pressure gradient force, friction with the earth’s 
surface, the Coriolis Effect, and the centrifugal effect.
3
 In reality, wind’s speed and 
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direction are determined by the simultaneous interaction of all these forces. However, in 
order to explain what causes each force and how it interacts with wind, the paragraphs that 
follow examine each force separately before combining them all into an example. 
The pressure gradient force initiates air movement from high to low pressure zones. 
As a result, the pressure gradient force is important in determining the initial speed and 
direction in which wind travels. Though the force is always present in creating wind, the 
velocity with which the force pushes the air from high to low pressure depends upon the 
difference between the pressure systems: the greater the difference in pressure, the greater 
the wind’s speed, while the lower the pressure difference the lower the wind’s speed. In 
addition to influencing speed, the pressure gradient also provides wind with its initial 
direction by forcing the air flow on the shortest path between pressure areas, a straight 
line.
4
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As soon as the pressure gradient starts pushing air from high to low pressure, 
another force, friction with the earth’s surface, begins to affect wind speed and direction. 
As the wind blows across the earth, air molecules come in contact with surface features 
such as mountains, plains, seas, oceans, and other such features and materials, causing the 
moving air to transfer some of its momentum energy. This leads to a decrease in wind 
speed. The greater the distance for wind to travel between high and low pressure zones, the 
greater is the momentum energy lost to friction.
5
 Besides decreasing wind velocity, friction 
also possesses the ability to change wind direction locally. Local landscapes, particularly 
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Pressure Gradient Force 
(Graphic obtained from http://home.comcast.net/~rhaberlin/pwpptnts.htm) 
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mountains, valleys, and hills, can force wind to shift direction in order to move around or 
through them.
6
 
Unlike the pressure gradient force or friction with the earth’s surface, the Coriolis 
Effect only minimally affects wind speed. Instead the effect focuses on manipulating wind 
direction, helping to create the global wind belts that circle the earth. French mathematician 
Gustave Gaspard Coriolis first described the effect in an 1835 scientific paper. In it he 
sought to explain why objects that moves across, but is not attached to the earth’s surface, 
such as long-range artillery shells, follow a curved path rather than a straight line, landing 
to the right of their intended target in the Northern Hemisphere and the left in the Southern 
Hemisphere.
7
 Coriolis explained the apparent deflection as a problem of perception due to 
the earth’s rotation. According to Isaac Newton’s second law of motion, in a non-rotating, 
non-accelerating system, objects moving in a straight line will continue to move in a 
straight line. However, because the earth does not follow these rules, it creates issues, 
specifically with wind direction.  
To understand how the earth’s rotation causes the Coriolis Effect, consider the 
example of a long-range artillery shell observed from the earth’s surface. On a non-rotating 
Earth, an artillery shell fired at a distant target would travel along a straight path and hit the 
target. Similarly an artillery shell fired at the same target on our rotating earth will begin 
traveling through the air along a straight path. However, while the shell travels toward the 
target, the earth rotates underneath it, causing the shell’s path to appear curved to the 
observer and miss the target. In reality the shell’s path did not curve, nor did it miss its 
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aiming point, instead the observer and the target moved as the earth rotated 
counterclockwise under the shell, deflecting the observed path.
8
  
In the same way, the Coriolis Effect also influences wind direction. Like the 
artillery shell traveling through the air, the atmosphere is not attached to the earth’s surface, 
which rotates underneath the atmosphere. As soon as a pressure gradient force creates 
wind, the Coriolis Effect begins to deflect that wind no matter which direction it  blows, 
either to the right (Northern Hemisphere) or left (Southern Hemisphere). Two factors 
ultimately determine the extent that the Coriolis Effect influences wind direction, latitude 
and wind speed. First, the farther from the equator a wind is generated, the greater the 
amount of deflection that occurs and second, as wind velocity increases, so too does the 
degree that the wind’s direction is changed. Combined, these two factors determine the 
extent that the Coriolis Effect shapes wind at any given moment.
9
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Coriolis Effect 
 
Earth’s Rotation 
(Graphic obtained from http://www.scioly.org/wiki/Everyday_Weather) 
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The fourth and final player that manipulates wind is the centrifugal effect. 
Comparable to the Coriolis Effect, the centrifugal effect also predominately concerns wind 
direction, relying on wind speed to determine its strength, and results from being viewed 
from a rotating frame of reference. Rather than causing wind to curve, the centrifugal effect 
acts in the opposite manner, attempting to straighten the wind’s direction by drawing air 
outward from its center of curvature. As a result, while the direction that the centrifugal 
effect attempts to pull wind may differ, it will always be away from the center of 
curvature.
10
 
 
 
  
Separately, the pressure gradient force, friction with the earth surface, the Coriolis 
Effect, and the centrifugal effect each represents important influences over wind velocity 
and direction. Nevertheless, to understand how wind occurs in the real world and what the 
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early United States Navy’s sailors and captains faced every day, one must combine these 
individual forces and effects to observe how they interact and influence each other, 
ultimately determining wind’s speed and direction. The example that follows will 
demonstrate the interconnectivity among these sometimes complementary and sometimes 
opposing forces and effects.  However, because the forces and effects involved constantly 
change, the example will focus on a single wind’s movement over a short time period. 
 Imagine a northern hemisphere high pressure zone, with a low pressure zone 
located to the west. With the pressure gradient difference large enough to induce a steady 
wind, the pressure gradient force begins pushing air westward toward the low pressure area 
(figure 1). Soon after the wind begins flowing toward the low pressure zone’s center, the 
Coriolis Effect starts deflecting the wind to the right, causing it to begin curving around the 
low pressure zone (figure 2). The curvature causes the centrifugal effect to act outward 
from the low pressure system’s center, straightening the wind’s direction (figure 3). 
However, as the wind blows across the earth’s surface, friction slows its velocity. As wind 
speed decreases, so too does the Coriolis and centrifugal effect’s influence over the wind’s 
direction. This allows the pressure gradient force to pull the wind’s direction back toward 
the low pressure area, increasing the wind’s speed and restarting the process (figure 4). 
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Forces of Wind Example (in Northern Hemisphere) 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Global, Regional, and Local Wind Patterns 
Over the past few hundred years, scientists have identified the forces and effects 
that drive wind and manipulate its speed and direction. Nevertheless, mankind has 
observed wind patterns for centuries, wondered why certain regions saw winds blowing 
predominantly from one direction all year, while others saw seasonal or daily changes in 
direction. Originating from these observations and the worldwide distribution of high and 
1 
2 
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The pressure gradient force 
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pressure zone. 
As the air flows toward the low 
pressure zone’s center, the Coriolis 
Effect pulls the wind back to the right 
causing it to curve around the low 
pressure zone. 
With the Coriolis Effect causing the 
wind to curve around the low pressure 
zone, the Centrifugal Effect begins 
pulling the wind direction away from 
the center of curvature. 
Finally as the wind flows over the 
Earth’s surface, friction slow the its 
speed causing the Coriolis and 
Centrifugal Effects to weaken and 
the wind direction to angle back 
toward the center of the low pressure 
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low pressure zones, three wind patterns that affect sailing emerge.  These include global 
prevailing winds, regional monsoonal winds and cyclonic storm systems, and localized 
land and sea breezes.
11
 
Global prevailing winds bear responsibility for creating earth’s basic surface wind 
patterns: the northeastern and southeastern trade winds, the northern and southern 
westerlies, and the northern and southern polar easterlies.
12
 Like all winds, the prevailing 
winds depend upon the sun’s unequal distribution of solar radiation over the earth’s 
surface. This creates two global low pressure bands and two global high pressure bands. 
The low pressure zones are located at the intertopical convergence zone in the equilateral 
region, while the other is found between 50 and 60 degrees north and south latitude. The 
first of the two global high pressure bands is located at approximately 30 degrees north and 
south latitude with the other zone at the poles. The air’s movement between these global 
high to low pressure bands generates the world’s primary winds. 
 Global wind circulation begins near the equator at the intertropical convergence 
zone, an area where solar radiation is at its maximum. Here the air warmed by the sun rises 
into the atmosphere creating a sustained low pressure band that dominates the region. In 
addition, because the majority of the intertropical convergence zone’s atmospheric 
movement is vertical, the region experiences very weak surface winds, called the doldrums. 
Simultaneously, as the warm equatorial air continues rising and moves away from the 
equator it cools and becomes denser. Near 30 degrees north and south latitude the air sinks 
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toward the surface creating a high pressure band. Once the descending air reaches the 
surface the air flow divides with part blowing back towards the equator and the other 
blowing towards the low pressure band found between 50 and 60 degrees north and south 
latitude, warming along the way as the wind picks up the heat that the warmer earth’s 
surface was radiating back into the atmosphere. The air that flows back towards the 
intertropical convergence zone, deflecting to the right in the northern hemisphere and to the 
left in the southern hemisphere by the Coriolis Effect and the other forces that influence 
wind, creates the northeast and southeast trade winds.
13
  
While half the air flowing from the 30 degree north and south latitude high pressure 
band returns to the intertropical convergence zone, the remaining air moves pole-ward. As 
the air flows over the earth’s surface it warms and rises into the atmosphere, generating a 
low pressure belt between 50 and 60 degrees north and south latitude. At the same time, the 
Coriolis Effect and the other direction influencing forces deflect the air flow eastward, 
producing the mid-latitude northern and southern westerlies.
14
 
 The third and final primary wind occurs near the poles, where solar radiation is at a 
minimum. Because the poles do not receive much heat energy from the sun, a large high 
pressure zone dominates the Polar Regions. The cold dense air flows away from the poles 
towards the low pressure band created by the rising warm westerlies between 50 and 60 
degrees north and south latitude. As the cooler denser air moves toward the low pressure 
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band, it is deflected westward and warmed by its contact with the earth’s surface, creating 
the northern and southern polar easterlies.
15
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Global Prevailing Winds 
(Graphic obtained from Earth Systems: Processes and Issues, pg. 161.) 
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In addition to the prevailing winds that dominate global air currents, specific 
regions also experience circulations that can override global wind patterns. These regional 
circulations result from two systems, the monsoons, which are responsible for seasonal 
wind reversals in the equatorial region, and cyclonic storms, such as hurricanes in the 
tropics and winter storms in the mid-latitudes. As a result, during certain times of the year 
regional wind circulations can cause wind directions to reverse or become highly variable, 
making understanding these regional wind changes instrumental for effective sailing in 
these regions. 
Though monsoons are best known for their heavy rainfall, their influence over a 
region’s wind gives the system its power. Located near the equator, monsoonal systems 
trigger seasonal changes in wind direction, prompting winds in the summer to blow from 
the opposite direction from which they blow in winter. The earth’s most well developed 
monsoonal system occurs in South Asia, but lesser developed systems also affect the 
southeastern United States, the Iberian Peninsula, western Africa, eastern Asia, and 
northern Australia. These reoccurring wind reversals rely on a region’s seasonal alternation 
between high and low pressure zones, caused by the earth’s tilted axis. Because the earth 
revolves and rotates on a tilted axis, the location on the planet that receives the most direct 
sunlight varies according to the time of year, triggering the intertropical convergence 
zone’s low pressure band location to change.16  
For example, take the monsoonal system that affects the Indian Subcontinent. 
During the summer, the sun’s rays most directly strike the northern tropics, causing the 
intertropical convergence zone to shift north. In South Asia, this means that its low 
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pressure band is situated north of the Himalayan Mountains. Air then flows from the 30 
degree south high pressure band, creating a moist southwest wind that drops large amounts 
of moisture on the subcontinent. During the winter, the winds reverse as the intertropical 
convergence zone travels to the southern tropics. Air now flows from the 30 degree north 
high pressure band, creating a dry northeast wind.
17
 
 
 
 
(Graphic obtained from Earth Science, figure 4-12, pg. 86.) 
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Besides the monsoonal systems, another regional circulation, cyclonic storms, also 
profoundly influences wind in large geographical areas. Formed by the collision between 
warm and cold air masses in the mid-latitudes and the rapid evaporation of water vapor in 
the tropics, cyclonic low pressure systems such as winter storms and hurricanes possess the 
ability to change surface wind direction as they approach and pass through a location. 
Unlike the massive high and low pressure bands that occupy specific latitudinal ranges and 
initiates the earth’s prevailing winds, cyclonic low pressure systems are smaller and have 
the capacity to move vast distances across the earth’s surface. As a cyclonic storm moves, 
air begins spiraling in towards the low pressure system’s center, counter-clockwise in the 
northern hemisphere and clockwise in the southern hemisphere. The spiraling produces 
surface winds that vary in speed and direction based on location within and proximity to 
the cyclonic storm’s center.18 
 
Cyclonic Storms 
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Northern Hemisphere Southern Hemisphere 
(Graphic obtained from http://www.physicalgeography.net/fundamentals/7n.html) 
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While the previous two wind types affect large areas, global and regional 
circulation, the third and final wind type that influences sailing, localized land and sea 
breezes, confine themselves to coastal areas. Like the monsoonal system, an alternation 
between high and low pressure zones also causes land and sea breezes to trigger reversals 
in wind direction. However, the high and low pressure zones involved are significantly 
smaller and the wind reversals occur on a daily rather than a seasonal cycle. During the 
day, the land absorbs the sun’s heat energy faster than the water, creating a small low-
pressure area over the land and a small high-pressure area over the water. In turn, air begins 
flowing from the water-centered high pressure zone to the land-centered low pressure zone, 
creating a wind blowing inland from the water, known as a sea breeze. At night, the 
situation reverses. The water retains its heat more effectively than the land, generating a 
low pressure zone over the warmer water and a high pressure zone over the cooler land. 
With the high and low pressure zones now reversed, the wind then switches direction, 
blowing from the land out to sea, known as a land breeze.
19
 
Land and Sea Breeze 
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Wind and Sailing 
No matter what form wind takes or what forces and effects influence it, wind 
represents the most important force to any sailing ship for three reasons. First, prior to the 
steam engine’s invention and other modern means of sea power, wind represented the only 
suitable method for long-distance oceanic travel. Catching wind with a sail provided the 
energy necessary to push a vessel through the water, making travel, intercontinental trade, 
establishing overseas colonies, and projecting military power worldwide possible. On the 
other hand, a lack of wind could either strand ships in the harbor, making it impossible for 
them to depart on trade or military operations, or even worse, strand a ship at sea with 
limited provisions. 
  
(Graphic obtained from http://www.discoverysailing.org/funvancouver/members-
lounge/general-library/navagation/points-of-sail.html) 
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In addition to providing the means of movement, wind also dictated in which 
directions oceanic travel occurred. Because sailing depends on capturing the wind’s power, 
the angle with which the wind contacts the sail determines the efficiency with which the 
ship moves. A vessel with a point of sailing between forty-five degrees on either side of the 
wind’s direction will not sail effectively, since the wind will not impact the sail correctly, 
causing the boat to slow, and if the course is continued, stop.
20
 For example, any sailing 
ship attempting to reach North America’s eastern coast from Europe cannot sail directly 
westward due to the westerlies. In turn, the ship must first sail to the south, and then utilize 
the northeastern trade winds to cross the Atlantic Ocean, before turning northwest to reach 
North America’s coast. Only on the return voyage to Europe could a vessel travel straight 
east. Therefore, when plotting a course or performing maneuvers, a captain must 
understand the wind’s prevailing direction and any changes that occur. 
Lastly, though wind acts in a positive manner for sailing ships, it also has a 
dangerous side. Periods of high winds, such as storms or sudden gusts, present unique 
dangers to sailing vessels. To begin with, gales possess the ability to damage a ship’s 
rigging and sails, inhibiting the vessel’s ability to maneuver, reducing its speed, and if 
severe enough, leaving the craft dead in the water. Strong winds also may cause a ship to 
capsize and sink.
21
 In addition to inflicting damage through sheer air velocity, winds also 
transfer energy, through friction, to the ocean surface, producing waves.
22
 Prolonged strong 
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winds can initiate heavy seas, which could sweep men and material overboard, damage 
water sensitive stores like gunpowder, and even swamp and sink a ship. As a result, wind 
represents an extremely useful, but possibly destructive force to sailing vessels, which 
needs careful observation. 
 
Period Understanding of Wind 
The question remains, with wind as such a dominating force to period navies, how 
much did they understand about the science behind it? To answer this, one must look at 
when scientists first gained the ability to accurately measure the wind. Invented in 1644 by 
mathematician and physicist Evangelista Torricelli, the first barometer allowed scientists to 
measure wind’s source and atmospheric pressure, and predict short-term weather 
changes.
23
 Scientific observations utilizing the technology allowed a reexamination of 
wind. In 1671 Ralph Bohun published his Discourse Concerning the Origins and 
Properties of Wind, which utilized data from voyages around the globe, as well as the 
writings of philosophers, such as Aristotle, and scientists, such as Francis Bacon, to analyze 
global, local (land and sea breezes), and tempestuous winds (hurricanes).
24
 Bohun even 
called for fitting vessels with barometers to predict and protect ships from hurricanes. 
However, at the time the instruments were too fragile to go to sea, often breaking as the 
                                                 
23
 Anita McConnell, “Barometer, Europe 1450 to 1789: Encyclopedia of the Early Modern World,” 
Encyclopedia.com, http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3404900091.html.  
24
 “The Helen Carmichael Purdy Foundation: A Legacy of Florida History,” University of Miami Library, 
http://www.library.miami.edu/specialcollections/collections/Purdy/purdy_bohun.htm, provides a synopsis of 
Ralph Bohun, A Discourse Concerning the Origin and Properties of Wind, With a Historical Account of 
Hurricanes and Other Tempestuous Winds (Oxford: Printed by W. Hall for Tho. Bowman, 1671). 
40 
ship’s motion caused the mercury filling its tubes to osculate and shatter the glass. It took 
almost one hundred years before Edward Naime produced a seaworthy barometer and until 
1854 before Admiral Robert Fitz-Roy installed them onto Royal Navy ships.
25
 As a result, 
even if American captains had understood the science behind wind, and some may have, 
the lack of a seaworthy barometer made this knowledge mute since there was no way to 
utilize it at sea. In addition the United States Navy was also slow to adopt the scientific 
examination of wind, not creating the Department of Charts and Instruments, which 
maintained the service’s naval instruments, conducted measurements, including wind, and 
supplied the Navy with nautical charts, until 1830.
26
 
While the science describing wind emerged in the early 17
th
 century, the technology 
to utilize that knowledge had yet to become widely available by the early 1800s. In turn, 
collective experience played a sizable role in a naval commander’s decision-making 
processes. As the following examples will show, a captain’s personal knowledge of an 
area’s wind characteristics often made the difference between victory and defeat. These 
experiences accumulated slowly as future captains progressed through the ranks, engaging 
in a naval apprentice system, and as they exchanged information about their experiences 
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with each other. As Europeans began exploring the world’s oceans they soon realized that 
the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean’s air circulations flowed in massive wind wheels.27 This 
early understanding of the world’s primary wind system helped Europeans begin their rapid 
colonization and economic expansion.  
With Europeans coming into contact with areas previously unknown to them, wind 
knowledge increased to include regional and later local patterns. Upon entering the Indian 
Ocean, Europeans came in contact with the world’s most powerful monsoons. Having 
minimal experience with monsoonal winds, early explorers suffered. Portuguese explorer 
Vasco Da Gama spent ninety-five days crossing back from India to Africa, losing so many 
crewmembers that they could barely operate their ships.
28
 Understanding local winds and 
land and sea breezes took more time, requiring mariners to gain the information either by 
visiting the area or talking to or reading about someone who had. By 1522, “Europeans had 
a sketchy but reasonably accurate comprehension of” the world’s ocean winds in the 
Atlantic from the Arctic Circle to 40ºS latitude, from the Indian Ocean’s northern coasts to 
15ºS latitude, as well as the Pacific Ocean’s trade winds and the winds off southern 
Africa.
29
 Continued ocean exploration over the next several hundred years enhanced 
collective wind knowledge leading to circumnavigation, international trade routes, and 
improved naval warfare wind tactics.
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Chapter 3: Wind as Friction 
Clausewitz said, “Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is 
difficult.” Though referring more to land warfare, the statement is no less true when 
applied to naval engagements.
1
 On paper such action seems easy; ships are sent from one 
area to another and ordered to undertake a variety of actions such as patrolling for and 
engaging enemy vessels, blockading enemy ports, and escorting friendly ships. However, 
understanding war in this way provides an incomplete comprehension of its difficulties. 
Clausewitz distinguishes this difference between “war on paper” and “real war” by using 
a concept called “friction.”2 
Similar to friction’s previous description used in chapter 2, wind friction referred 
to the physical resistance wind encountered when passing over a surface such as land or 
water. Clausewitz expanded and applied it to war as a “force that makes the apparently 
easy so difficult.”3 In war it encompasses all aspects ranging from command and control, 
movement, danger, hardship, privation, and uncertainty to luck and chance, which are 
essential in this chapter. To depict chance and luck, Clausewitz employed weather as an 
example, discussing how fog and rain could slow movement and communication or 
prevent, hinder, or change the tide of battle.
4
 While these weather phenomena have a 
significant impact on war, one aspect lacking analysis is wind and its influence on naval 
warfare. 
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For sailing ships victory comes from maneuvering to bring their guns to bear 
against the enemy or out sailing them if outnumbered or outgunned. A sailing vessel’s 
ability to accomplish these tactics depends almost entirely on how the wind at the time 
behaved. Because wind is a natural force, it cannot be controlled, only reacted to. As a 
result, wind plays an active role in creating friction both inside and outside battle. In its 
early wars, the United States Navy often faced friction events where changes in wind 
direction and intensity directly altered battle dynamics. Doing so led to delays, hindered 
movement, allowed escapes, and even inflicted damage upon vessels.  
 
Delay of Commodore Dale’s Squadron 
Because wind dictates the direction sailing ships may travel, it is possible for 
wind to prevent or make sailing in a desired direction difficult. One example where wind 
prevented travel occurred in mid-1801 as relations with North Africa’s Barbary States 
began breaking down. Unwilling to give in to the rising tribute demands and wanting to 
present a show of force, newly elected President Thomas Jefferson dispatched a squadron 
to the Mediterranean to protect American merchant vessels from pirate attack.
5
 
Assembled in Norfolk, Virginia under Commodore Richard Dale, the squadron 
(United States frigates President, Philadelphia, and Essex, as well as the schooner 
Enterprise) prepared to depart on their mission.
6
 However, as the vessels readied to sail, 
“adverse winds” thwarted the squadron’s effort to leave port until the end of May and 
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hampered the group’s journey across the Atlantic. With the schooner Enterprise being 
faster and better able to deal with the unfavorable winds, Commodore Dale sent its ahead 
to Gibraltar, arriving several days before the other squadron members, who did not reach 
Gibraltar’s harbor until July 2nd.7  
Upon arrival, Dale’s ships encountered two large Tripolitan cruisers preparing to 
pass through the strait and enter the Atlantic, where they could prey on the large number 
of American merchant ships traversing those waters. Though the Tripolitan’s commander 
assured Commodore Dale that “no state of war existed between Tripoli and the United 
States,” the Americans did not put any trust in this assurance. To prevent the cruisers 
from slipping out into the Atlantic, Commodore Dale ordered one frigates to stay behind 
and guard the Strait of Gibraltar.
8
 
Even after entering the Mediterranean, the weather continued impeding the 
remaining American ship’s progress, preventing them from appeared off Tripoli’s coast 
until July 24
th
, nearly a month after leaving Gibraltar. Here the United States learned that 
it was too late to negotiate with Tripoli’s ruler. Having already declared war, the Pasha 
claimed that “the United States had been delinquent in meeting the terms of the treaty,” 
and found the treaty proposed by the Americans “unfavorable” in comparison to those 
between the United States and other Barbary States. With diplomatic channels no longer 
open, Commodore Dale commenced the First Barbary War by instituting a blockade on 
Tripoli that lasted until the war’s end.9 
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Sending Commodore Dale’s squadron to the Mediterranean marked a significant 
development in the United States Navy, representing one of its first missions to project 
power overseas. Yet, the wind’s friction elements, specifically unfavorable wind 
direction, presented a serious hindrance in accomplishing the mission. Not only did wind 
prevent the American squadron’s timely sailing, forcing it to stay in port for several days, 
but it also inhibited its journey across the Atlantic, almost proving disastrous for United 
States commerce. The American ships reached the Strait of Gibraltar just in time to 
intercept the two Tripolitan cruisers preparing to slip into the Atlantic. Had the wind 
presented any additional delays, the Tripolitans may have entered the Atlantic Ocean and 
freely attacked the United States merchantmen sailing there. The adverse wind conditions 
continued as the remaining United States ships entered the Mediterranean, once again 
slowing the force. In this case, the delay resulted in the Americans arriving off Tripoli 
after the Pasha had already declared war on the United States, making negotiations to 
avert the conflict doubtful. 
Finally, this case also revealed a key weakness of relying on any sort of wind, 
even primary winds, for movement. While primary winds represent the main direction 
that the wind blows in an area, they can be overcome periodically by disruptions to their 
normal flow, in Commodore Dale’s case the east blowing westerlies. Possible causes for 
these interruptions include local land and sea breezes that last for several hours, cyclonic 
storms that can last a week or more, or unseasonably high or low ocean temperatures, 
which can alter global wind currents for months by moving, strengthening, or weakening 
an atmospheric convection cell’s high or low pressure zones. These last two examples 
provide the best explanations for the squadron’s delays, though it is difficult to determine 
46 
which one exactly because of a lack of meteorological data on ocean temperatures, 
barometric pressures, or storm tracks from the time. 
 
Surrender of the USS President 
 
(Graphic obtained from http://collections.rmg.co.uk/collections/objects/148101.html) 
 
The next example detailing wind-creating friction occurred when Commodore 
Stephen Decatur took over command of the frigate President in April 1814. While 
anchored in New York harbor, the frigate received orders to “sail to the far side of the 
world to prey on the enemy’s East India commerce.”10 Over the months that followed, the 
President refitted for its mission and waited for its chance to slip by the British squadron 
blockading the harbor. On the evening of January 13, 1815, Decatur got his wish, when a 
strong winter gale created by a cyclonic low pressure system forced the blockading 
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squadron off its station near Sandy Hook and exposed an unguarded corridor to the open 
ocean.
11
 
The following evening, Commodore Decatur weighed anchor and proceeded out 
to sea. However, the driving winter storm and the pitch-black night made navigation 
increasingly difficult and, not long after casting off, the heavily laden frigate grounded 
itself on a sandbar.
12
 For over an hour and a half the ship struggled to free itself from the 
bar, in the process breaking several rudder braces, and “received such other material 
injury as to render her return into port desirable.”13 At this point the strong westerly gale, 
which originally seemed a blessing, now turned into a curse, preventing the wounded 
ship from returning to harbor.
14
 With few options available, Decatur ordered the ship 
over the bar before the low tide completely stranded it. By 10 o’clock that night the 
frigate freed itself and set a course northeast along the Long Island coast, proceeding 50 
miles before turning southeast by east.
15
 
While the President floundered on the sand bar outside New York harbor, the 
displaced British squadron sought to reestablish its blockade. Rather than fight its way 
through the gale back to its original position, Commodore John Hayes ordered one 
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British ship to cover the southern approaches to New York. The remaining ships headed 
north to the Long Island coast covering the path he thought an American vessel would 
use to escape the harbor.
 16
 By 5 a.m. the following morning, Commodore Hayes’s 
squadron spotted the President and began closing on the American frigate.
17
  
Outnumbered four to one Decatur turned to run north, but the damage done to the 
President’s hull slowed the ship by several knots and caused it to take on so much water 
that its pumps needed to be worked.
18
 By midday the winds that allowed Decatur to open 
some distance from the pursuing British had turned light and baffling, permitting the 
undamaged frigate HMS Endymion to gain considerably on the running American. In a 
last ditch effort to escape, Decatur ordered all articles not essential for battle, such as 
anchors, spare rigging, and even  provisions, thrown overboard to lighten the ship.
19
 
The effort proved futile as the British continued to advance on the President, 
reaching cannon range at three that afternoon and beginning a gun duel between the 
Endymion’s bow guns and Decatur’s stern guns. Two hours later, the Endymion reached a 
position so close to the President’s starboard quarter that Decatur could bring neither his 
stern nor quarter guns to bear on the British. Decatur then prepared to board the British 
frigate, hoping “that she would close with us on our broadside,” but the British 
maintained their position being perfectly happy to peck away at the President’s sails and 
rigging.
20
 With the enemy in perfect position to cripple the United States frigate without 
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presenting itself as a target, Decatur found himself lacking options. Decatur therefore 
adjusted course, turning towards the enemy with the intention to either board and capture 
the Endymion or disable it before the British squadron’s remaining members could close, 
thus allowing the President to escape into the falling darkness.
21
 
Due to the Commodore Hayes’s seamanship and insufficient wind, Decatur 
proved unable to put his ship in boarding position. In the battle that followed, the two 
frigates went muzzle to muzzle exchanging broadsides. Although taking heavy casualties, 
the President badly cut up the enemy’s sails and rigging, knocking the Endymion out of 
the chase.
22
 Even though the American frigate escaped, the battle cost Decatur vital time, 
allowing the remaining enemy ships to close in and inflict additional damage, slowing the 
ship more. Over the next two hours, the President attempted to outrun the fresh British 
ships Pomone and Teneedos. Nonetheless, by eleven that night Decatur found his ship 
surrounded “without a chance of escape” and determined he had no choice but to 
surrender.
23
 
As a force of friction the wind’s direction and intensity played an important role 
in the USS President’s eventual capture, affecting both sides during the long battle. At 
first the gale obstructed the British, forcing their squadron off station and preventing it 
from returning to its position. This opened an escape lane for the American ships 
blockaded in New York harbor. Yet, when the President struck the sand bar, the strong 
west gale prevented Decatur from returning his wounded ship to port, forcing him instead 
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to run over the bar and damage his ship more in a desperate attempt to beat the 
recovering British to open sea. Finally, as the chase proceeded, a new obstacle presented 
itself to the American frigate. As the cyclonic storm, which had originally caused heavy 
winds, moved out of the battle zone the winds began lightening. This change in wind 
velocity now prevented Decatur from successfully executing maneuvers that may have 
saved his ship. Together, all the wind elements in this encounter exemplify the role that 
chance and luck play in friction. 
 
Escape of the USS Hornet 
Besides preventing movement in a desired direction, wind also possesses the 
ability to alter battle dynamics by changing direction suddenly. On April 27, 1815, the 
sloops USS Hornet and USS Peacock were patrolling the shipping lanes off Africa’s 
southern tip searching for British merchant ships.
24
 Around 7 a.m., the Peacock sighted a 
strange ship bearing south-southeast and signaled the Hornet.
25
 Thinking the ship to be a 
British Indiaman, a merchant ship engaged in trade with India, the two sloops set all sails 
in chase.
26
 
The American sloops continued the chase through the night and into the following 
day. However, as two ships closed, the Peacock began to question their chase’s identity.27 
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At roughly 3:30 p.m. the Peacock signaled the Hornet that their “chase was a line of 
battle ship” and determined fifteen minutes later “that the strange sail was English.”28 
Immediately, both sloops abandoned the chase and turned to flee on differing courses. 
The Peacock, being faster, soon left the Hornet behind.
29
 The Hornet’s captain, James 
Biddle, ordered the ship tacked as close to the wind as possible, hoping that his smaller 
ship would out-weather (that is steer farther into the wind) than the much larger HMS 
Cornwallis.
30
 
Over the next few hours, to Captain Biddle’s surprise, the Cornwallis 
demonstrated its speed and quickly closed on the Hornet. By nine that night, the British 
ship of the line had narrowed the chase so much that Biddle considered it essential to 
lighten the ship and started cutting away the sheet anchors and “hove overboard the sheet 
cable, a quantity of shot, spare rigging, and heavy spars.”31 Nevertheless, the action 
seemed in vain as by daybreak on the 29
th
 the Cornwallis pulled within gun-shot on the 
American’s lee-quarter and by 7 a.m. commenced fire with its bow guns.32  
With shot sailing over his ship, Biddle endeavored to lighten his ship even more, 
ordering his crew to “cut away the remaining anchor and cable, threw overboard the 
launch, six of our guns, more of our shot, and every heavy article that was at hand.”33 The 
action seemed to work, allowing the Hornet to open up enough distance on their British 
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pursuer that it ceased fire around nine that morning. Two hours later, the enemy once 
again came up and recommenced fire. With defeat and capture starring him in the face, 
Biddle made his last and most aggressive order to lighten the ship. Throughout the early 
afternoon, the Hornet’s crew threw overboard the remaining guns except one long gun, 
the remaining shot, twenty four barrels of salted provisions, the armorer’s forge, and 
everything else below and on deck that would lighten the ship, including cutting away the 
top gallant forecastle to take advantage of any squalls that might occur.
34
  
Even with the ship nearly emptied, the Hornet seemed at the Cornwallis’s mercy 
as grape and round shot sailed through its rigging and splashed around it. Just as 
surrender seemed the only option though, “the wind which had [been] previously and 
greatly to our disadvantage, backed to the southeast, hauled to the westward, and 
freshened up,” as the mid-latitude westerly prevailing wind strengthened and allowed the 
Hornet to pull away.
35
 Over the evening of the 29
th
, the Cornwallis fell farther and farther 
behind, until the mighty ship of the line finally gave up the chase that morning.
36
 
 In the chase that developed between the USS Hornet and HMS Cornwallis, wind 
once again showed its unpredictability and the friction it causes in battle. Through the 
bulk of the chase, the wind favored the much larger and heavier British ship. This 
allowed it to gain on the smaller American sloop and prevented the Hornet from 
escaping, even after being drastically lightened. As the last options seemed exhausted, the 
wind changed direction back to the westerly prevailing wind of the region and increased 
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velocity as the pressure gradient force between increased. In doing so, the new wind 
reversed the chase’s dynamic and permitted the Hornet’s escape.  
 
Capture of the USS Essex 
 
(Graphic obtained from Abel Bowen’s The Naval Monument) 
 
While a shift in direction and an increase in wind speed enabled the Hornet to 
escape a British ship of the line, a sudden gale and a shift from a land to a sea breeze 
proved disastrous for another American ship. Under Captain David Porter, the United 
States frigate Essex set out on its naval tour on October 17, 1812 with orders to link up 
with his superior, Commodore William Bainbridge, and the frigate USS Constitution off 
the Brazilian coast. From here the two ships would confront the British force patrolling 
the area. However, the Constitution’s clash with the British frigate Java forced 
Bainbridge to return to the United States. Upon learning this Captain Porter resolved to 
54 
round South America and take the battle to the enemy in the Pacific Ocean, reaching 
Valparaiso, Chile on March 14, 1813.
37
  
For nearly a year, the Essex prowled South America’s western coast terrorizing 
British commerce. Aggravated by the state of affairs, the British Admiralty dispatched 
two ships commanded by Commodore James Hillyar with “orders to find him [USS 
Essex] at all hazards.”38 After receiving letters detailing the two British vessels sent to 
hunt the Essex, Captain Porter prepared his ships, making repairs and taking on 
provisions. Confident in his ship and crew, the Essex then headed for the waters off 
Valparaiso, Chile, believing the British would likely seek the American frigate there.
39
 
On February 8, 1814 the British 36 gun frigate HMS Phoebe and the 18 gun sloop 
HMS Cherub sighted the 46 gun Essex and a small 20 gun prize named the Essex Junior 
resting at anchor in Valparaiso harbor.
40
 Upon arrival, Commodore Hillyar ordered his 
force to enter the harbor, intending to meet with the American commander and discuss 
the port’s neutrality. Yet, due to the area’s variable winds, which would later trouble the 
Essex, the British misjudged the distance between themselves and the Americans upon 
entering the harbor, nearly leading to a collision.
41
 After agreeing on Valparaiso harbor’s 
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neutrality with Captain Porter and taking on provisions, the British withdrew and took up 
a blockading position.
42
 
The British blockade continued for well over a month as the American ships 
provisioned and issued challenges attempting to draw the British into a frigate-on-frigate 
duel. The British continually declined, refusing to engage the Essex in a contest that put 
them at a disadvantage. Amid the British refusing to give battle, Captain Porter soon 
feared that more British ships might soon arrive. As a result, on March 27
th
 Porter 
devised a plan to leave port. The following morning with a fresh south wind, the Essex 
made sail for open sea seeking to pull the British away from the harbor and give the 
smaller Essex Junior the opportunity to escape and rendezvous later.
43
 Shortly after 
weighing anchor Captain Porter, thinking his ship faster than the enemy, noticed a gap 
opening up in the British blockade and immediately sought to exploit it and out-weather 
(meaning steer closer to the direction of the wind) the enemy.
44
 
However, just as it seemed the Essex might escape, disaster struck. “On rounding 
the point, a heavy squall struck the ship and carried away her [the Essex’s] main top 
mast,” drowning the men aloft and significantly slowing the ship.45 With both the Phoebe 
and the Cherub bearing down on the wounded American frigate, Captain Porter struggled 
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to regain his ship’s former anchorage but a shift in wind direction and the ship’s crippled 
condition made doing so nearly impossible.
46
 Instead, the Essex retreated to a small bay 
on the harbor’s east side and set about repairing its damaged main mast. The British 
refused to let the American frigate off the hook, perusing the damaged ship and preparing 
to attack “regardless of the neutrality of the place where [the Essex] was anchored.”47 
At just before 4 o’clock that afternoon, the British duo brought the Essex to battle. 
The Phoebe took up position on the Essex’s stern, while the Cherub placed itself off the 
starboard bow. Over the next half hour, the two warships fired shot after shot at each 
other with great effect on both sides. The Essex commenced a hot fire on the Cherub, 
forcing the sloop to join the Phoebe on the American’s stern.48 From their location, the 
British did terrible damage, killing and wounding many, as they repeatedly raked the 
Essex’s hull and thwarted Captain Porter’s attempts to bring his broadside to bear.49 Even 
in its vulnerable position the Essex fought back, firing three long twelve pounder’s, the 
only guns that Captain Porter could aim at the British, soon disabling both British ships 
and compelling them to withdraw for repairs.
50
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 Quickly repairing the damage, Commodore Hillyar renewed the attack, with both 
ships taking up positions at distance on the Essex’s starboard quarter. Here the Phoebe 
and Cherub “kept up a most galling fire,” severely damaging the American ship’s sails 
and cutting nearly every rope in the rigging with their long guns. While the destruction 
devastated the vessel, worst of all was the Essex’s inability to return the British fire.  
Even though Captain Porter’s ship mounted 46 guns, the overwhelming majority, 40, 
were carronades, a very destructive but short range weapon. In addition to outreaching 
the Essex’s carronades, the British position also prevented the American ship from 
bringing its six long guns on target.
51
 
Not willing to go down without a fight and realizing that the only way to attack 
the enemy meant “getting under way and becoming the assailant,” Captain Porter ordered 
his only remaining operational sail hoisted. He then “ran down on both ships” intending 
to board the Phoebe. With heavy fire coming from both sides, the Essex “was rendered a 
perfect wreck,” its decks “strewed with dead,” its “cock-pit filled with wounded,” and on 
fire. Even facing such carnage, Captain Porter kept closing on the Phoebe and forced the 
Cherub to haul off, reinvigorating the crew and giving them hope that the ship might yet 
be saved. The Phoebe dashed these hopes, keeping their distance instead and utilizing 
their superior range to rain death and destruction on the Essex.
52
 
Realizing that the British possessed the capacity to choose the distance at which 
the battle was engaged, the American frigate “gave up all hopes of closing with [the 
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Phoebe].” With night falling and few options remaining, Captain Porter decided to run 
the ship aground, put ashore his men, and burn it, rather than let it fall into British hands. 
At first the wind’s direction favored the Essex’s endeavor, being a sea breeze. However 
just as the ship neared the shore, the wind direction reversed, changing to a land breeze as 
the faster cooling land became a high pressure area and the warmer sea became a low 
pressure zone. This reversal of the wind’s direction in turn blew the American frigate 
back towards the enemy. Once again under the enemy’s murderous fire, Captain Porter 
observed, “The slaughter on board my ship now became horrible, the enemy continued to 
rake us, and were unable to bring a gun to bear.” With the situation now desperate, 
Captain Porter managed to fasten “a hawser to the sheet-anchor,… bringing his ship’s 
head around” and allowing the Essex’s few remaining guns to fire a broadside into the 
HMS Phoebe. This forced the British frigate to withdraw thereby giving the Americans 
one last hope to escape defeat.
53
 
The Essex’s misfortune continued as the hawser soon snapped, leaving the ship 
now completely uncontrollable. To make matters worse, the fires set earlier on the Essex 
now spread throughout the ship, threatening to ignite the powder magazine. Learning 
this, Captain Porter ordered the crew to abandon ship and swim the roughly three quarters 
of a mile to shore. Nevertheless, most crewmembers refused to leave their captain, 
preferring to share his and the ship’s fate. Those who remained extinguished the flames 
and returned to their guns, keeping up their fire for several more minutes.
54
 In spite of the 
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crew’s courage, winning the battle at this point proved unobtainable. With all but one 
officer killed or wounded, the crew decimated, and the British using the crippled Essex 
for target practice, Captain Porter saw no reason to prolong the engagement.
55
 At roughly 
twenty minutes past six that evening, the Essex struck its colors, surrendering to 
Commodore Hillyar and ending the bloody struggle.
56
 
As the Essex’s capture shows, wind possesses the ability to quickly and without 
warning wreak destruction upon an unsuspecting ship. Starting out, the wind seemed to 
favor the American frigate as a fresh south wind gave the vessel an opportunity to escape 
the British blockade. Yet, just as it appeared Captain Porter would succeed in out-
weathering the enemy and enter the open ocean, the wind halted the Essex’s plans.  
At the most inopportune moment, a squall caused by the sudden increase in the 
pressure gradient forces, followed by a shift in the wind’s direction from a sea breeze to a 
land breeze not only crippled the frigate, significantly slowing its speed and limiting its 
maneuverability, but also prevented the Essex from returning to its previous anchorage to 
make repairs beyond the enemy’s reach. Instead, the wind’s friction in this case plunged 
Captain Porter’s already wounded ship into a battle he did not want to fight, against an 
enemy with superior range and now superior maneuverability. After taking significant 
damage and casualties throughout the fight, Captain Porter attempted to run the Essex 
aground and burn it in order to save his wounded crew and prevent the ship from falling 
into British hands. Once again the wind supported Essex’s move at first, but as night 
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began to fall and the land cooled, the wind switched direction, this time from a sea to a 
land breeze, which blew the frigate back into the battle and more slaughter. Together this 
example of wind’s friction displays its destructive side, first through direct destruction 
and next through preventing the ship from disengaging from a losing battle. 
 
Destruction of the USS Alligator 
Lastly, while wind friction elements like direction and intensity change, though 
sometimes unexpected, are not uncommon, such as the daily change from a sea to a land 
breeze that affected the Essex, others were extremely rare and therefore difficult to 
fathom. One such example led to the schooner USS Alligator’s destruction and sinking. 
On July 1, 1814, the schooner lay at anchor in Port Royal Sound when a severe 
thunderstorm caused either by a hurricane or mid-latitude low pressure system rolled into 
the area. Suddenly, a violent tornado appeared and struck the Alligator, causing the ship 
to capsize and sink, killing twenty-three crewmen.
57
 In modern eyes, weather forecasting 
seems commonplace, but in the early nineteenth century no such warning systems 
existed. As a result, what happened to the Alligator highlights not only how violent and 
destructive wind can be, but also how vulnerable sailing ships were to strong 
thunderstorms and hurricanes.
58
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Chapter 4: Combating Wind as Friction 
 Though the instances in which wind’s friction elements directly influenced 
engagement outcomes in America’s early wars impart exciting and interesting stories, 
they do not present the entire role that wind played in shaping the naval development and 
history. Throughout the history of warfare human beings have attempted not only to react 
to nature, but to overcome and control its foreseeable friction components through 
intellect and technology. Such examples include understanding wind’s influence on a 
projectile’s flight path and adjusting aim to compensate or utilizing tracked vehicles to 
traverse muddy or rugged terrain. In a similar way, over the centuries mariners adapted 
naval tactics that exploited wind as a source of movement. As a result, in addition to 
examining wind’s direct influence on engagements, comprehending wind’s full impact on 
the navy’s development must also include a discussion of combat tactics.  
At the time, two competing schools, coming from the world’s two most dominant 
naval powers, dictated the discussion on naval tactics, both having their own opinion on 
how to best utilize their ships in warfare. The first doctrine came from the French who 
advocated a cautious approach to battle. Arming their ships primarily with long, heavy 
guns, made them deadly at long range. The French then instructed their captains to fight 
only in situations where the odds favored them, such as advantages in speed, numbers, or 
firepower, or when retreat proved impossible. Using this strategy created a doctrine that 
placed the ship and crew’s safety above defending honor and achieving personal glory.1 
 On the other hand, the British promoted a far more aggressive attitude, expecting 
their ships to fight at a moment’s notice and continue until disabled, sinking, or 
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 Chidsey, The Wars in Barbary, 29, 48-49. 
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victorious. In order to accomplish this, the Royal Navy took on a more balanced approach 
toward arming their ships. Rather than equipping their navy with only traditional heavy 
long guns, the British also placed the newly designed carronade on their vessels. The new 
weapon, though short ranged, proved ideal for the close quarters combat the British 
favored, by allowing Royal Navy ships to load and fire a large, heavy projectile quickly.
2
 
 The French navy’s tactical conception, which refused to expose its vessels to 
undue risk, seemed a wise decision for the American navy due to its small size and 
limited pool from which to draw crewmen. Navy captains instead chose the more familiar 
and aggressive British approach toward combat, showing that the Americans would not 
back down from challenges to the young country or its honor.
3
 However, the British 
strategy created a vital question that needed answering. How could the small and 
inexperienced United States Navy fight aggressively without losing valuable ships? 
Whereas the Royal Navy’s gargantuan size mitigated the loss of any one ship, any defeat 
sustained by the small American fleet seriously inhibited its ability to function. To lessen 
the danger, the United States Navy focused on several specific wind tactics allowing its 
captains to act aggressively, but at the same time limiting the small American fleet’s 
exposure to unfavorable engagements. 
 
Weather Gage Tactics 
 In the age of sail, the weather gage or any position upwind of an opponent 
represented the most advantageous attack position for a warship. Achieving this location 
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allowed the vessel possessing it to dictate the engagement by deciding whether to press or 
break off an attack. As such an important tactical position in any battle, understanding 
how to utilize the weather gage, as well as how to deny its advantages to the enemy often 
represented the difference between victory and defeat.  
 Of these engagements, the battles between the United States frigate Constellation 
and the heavy French frigate La Vengeance, fought during the Quasi War, and the United 
States frigate Constitution and the British frigate Guerriere, fought early in the War of 
1812, provide excellent characterizations of how the navy utilized the weather gage. In 
both encounters, the United States frigates possessed the weather gage from the battle’s 
beginning to its end, providing a sample of how American naval captains exploited this 
advantage, destroying or capturing the enemy. 
 
USS Constellation vs. La Vengeance 
 At 7 a.m. on February 1, 1800, while sailing east near the Caribbean island of St. 
Kitts, the United States frigate Constellation, commanded by Captain Thomas Truxtun, 
sighted an unknown sail to the southeast. Believing the large unknown ship to have come 
from the nearby English holding of Martinica, Captain Truxtun ordered English colors 
raised, hoping to induce the ship to come towards them and avoid a long chase.
4
 On 
board the yet unrecognized La Vengeance, Captain F.M Pitot, operating under orders to 
return to France and wanting to avoid conflict so close to an English holding, 
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immediately changed course and set sail to the southwest after discovering the disguised 
vessel. The Constellation mirrored this move and the chase continued.
5
 
 As the morning progressed, the distance between the two ships narrowed, 
allowing Captain Truxtun to ascertain his quarry’s identity as the French heavy frigate La 
Vengeance.
6
 Shortly before noon, Captain Truxtun ordered the ship prepared for action 
and the English colors taken down. Yet, just as the engagement seemed imminent, the 
wind suddenly fell calm and threatened to end the chase if the condition persisted. By 1 
p.m. the wind freshened, permitting the Constellation to close quickly on their chase, but 
even as the distance between the two ships narrowed, Captain Pitot refused to give the 
battle. Seven hours later and with night already fallen, Captain Tuxtun finally pulled the 
Constellation within hailing distance, raised the United States ensign, and demanded the 
French frigate’s surrender.7 
The La Vengeance responded by opening fire from its stern guns, targeting the 
Constellation’s rigging with the intent to disable the American. Undeterred, Captain 
Truxtun bore down on the enemy, maintaining the weather gage by closing in on the 
enemy’s starboard quarter. This forced the French captain into a difficult situation. Either 
do nothing and allow the Constellation to fire broadsides into the La Vengeance without 
the capability to return fire, or maneuver to engage the enemy in close combat. Captain 
Pitot chose the latter, ordering the French frigate to tack into the wind and bring its 
broadside to bear against the American.
8
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Taking the French broadside, Captain Truxtun copied the maneuver, successfully 
maintaining the weather gage and bringing his ship into close action along the La 
Vengeance’s weather quarter. Locked in battle, the two frigates thundered away at each 
other late into the night. Just before 1 a.m. the battle finally reached its conclusion when 
the French frigate’s guns fell silent and it fell off into the Constellation’s wake. Having 
sustained heavy damage to his own ship’s rigging, Captain Truxtun decided to pull away 
from his prize for repairs. However, while doing so the Constellation’s mainmast 
collapsed, permitting the heavily damaged French vessel to slip away into the darkness to 
make repairs and fight another day.
9
 
 
USS Constitution vs. HMS Guerriere 
Another instance portraying the American navy’s exploitation of the weather gage 
comes from the battle between the United States frigate Constitution and the British 
frigate Guerriere. On August 19, 1812, the Constitution commanded by Captain Isaac 
Hull was patrolling the North Atlantic off New England. At 2 p.m. that afternoon, while 
riding a north wind on a south southwesterly course, the Constitution spotted a mast off 
its bow. Unable to ascertain the ship’s identity due to its great distance, Captain Hull 
immediately ordered all sails set and made chase of the unknown vessel.
10
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Over the next hour, the Constitution closed rapidly on the unknown ship’s 
weather beam, and by 3 p.m. determined the chase’s course to be west by southwest on a 
starboard tack close on the wind. Half an hour later the vessel was identified as a large 
frigate.
11
 Shortly after 4 p.m. the two ships closed within cannon range, hoisted their 
colors, and prepared for battle. The HMS Guerriere’s commander, Captain James Dacres, 
then initiated the fighting, firing a broadside at the Constitution and wore, changed tacks 
by turning its stern to the wind, to prevent the American from crossing its bow and raking 
the deck with impunity. Captain Hull quickly returned fire, exchanging broadsides with 
the Guerriere as it wore from one tack to the other trying to prevent the Constitution from 
utilizing the weather gage.
12
 
For more than an hour and a half the two ships fired and maneuvered, but neither 
inflicted a decisive blow. However, not long after 6 p.m. the Constitution successfully 
exploited the weather gage by running up alongside the British frigate and engaging at 
close range. Pouring round and grape shot into the enemy, Captain Hull devastated the 
Guerriere, felling the ship’s mizzen mast and main yard as well as damaging its hull and 
sails, all in under fifteen minutes. The damage made controlling the British frigate 
difficult, leaving it vulnerable. Now possessing a speed advantage, the Constitution shot 
ahead of the enemy, crossing its bow and taking up a raking position. From there the 
Americans unleashed more punishment upon the already damaged British vessel, firing 
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broadsides with impunity into the enemy and wreaking “havock amongst his men on the 
forecastle and did great injury to his forerigging and sails.”13  
Attempting to fight back, Captain Dacres got his bow guns trained on the 
Constitution and moved off a little from his opponent to disengage and make some quick 
repairs. However, just as it seemed the British might be able to get back into the fight, the 
Guirriere suddenly lost both its fore and main mast, which were damaged earlier in the 
fight, “leaving the ship a perfect unmanageable wreck.”14 Seeing the enemy disabled, 
Captain Hull disengaged to make repairs to his ship’s rigging. Half an hour later, the 
Constitution returned to determine if the enemy had struck its colors and after 
investigating received the Guirriere’s surrender.15 
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USS Constitution vs. HMS Guerriere Battle Map 
 
 
(Graphic obtained from http://www.ussconstitutionmuseum.org/constitution-
resources/the-captain-speaks/constitution-defeats-hms-guerriere) 
The illustration shows how using the weather gage, the USS Constitution controlled the 
engagement with the HMS Guerriere by approaching from its dead angle and then 
closing and firing several broadsides. Finally after disabling the enemy, the Constitution 
crossed its bow, delivering the coup de grace. 
Wind North 
HMS Guerriere 
USS Constitution 
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In the battles described above, both the Constellation and the Constitution 
observed an unknown sail on the horizon and immediately turned to give chase, each 
time paying close attention to acquire and exploit the weather gage. Approaching their 
targets from their weather quarter, Captains Truxtun and Hull were both able to control 
the engagement, possessing the ability to react to and counter any move made by the 
enemy, as well as force the enemy to make mistakes and expose themselves to attack. 
Furthermore, once the two American ships closed on their targets, each took up and 
attempted to maintain a position in the enemy’s dead angle, a position off either stern 
quarter in which none of the targeted ship’s guns can be trained to fire.16  
This left the chase (that is, the enemy ship being pursued) with two options. One, 
maintain course and attempt to outrun the enemy, risking that the pursuer might close and 
open fire at close range without itself presenting a target. The other option was to wear, 
bringing the ship’s broadside to bear against its pursuer. Both La Vengeance and HMS 
Guerriere chose the latter option, deciding to turn repeatedly so as to fire on the 
American frigates trailing them. However, performing such a maneuver greatly decreases 
a vessel’s speed, allowing in each case for the chasing ship to bring the enemy into a 
close quarter engagement. In addition, the disparity in speed caused by wearing also 
gives the faster chase ship the possibility to cross the enemy’s bow and take up a raking 
position, allowing the attacker to fire down the entire length of the enemy’s deck without 
exposing itself to return fire. 
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 As the tactics used by the Constellation and the Constitution demonstrate, 
American captains understood just as well as captains from other more experienced 
navies the importance of gaining, maintaining, and exploiting the weather gage. In doing 
so, both American frigates and the navy as a whole proved able to stand up to a more 
heavily armed opponent, in the Constellation’s case, and out-fight a seasoned opponent 
from the era’s most powerful navy as did the Constitution.17 
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Dead Angle 
 
Dead Angles (colored in grey) 
 
 
 
 
Advantages of the Weather Gage 
 
 
This illustration demonstrates the advantage in maneuvering that possessing the weather gage (grey 
ship) allows. 
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Bow Raking Position 
 
 
In this graphic, the grey ship possesses a raking position across the white ship’s bow. 
 
 
 
Negating or Seizing the Weather Gage 
 While the battles illustrate how the navy utilized the weather gage to defeat the 
enemy, fighting from such an advantageous position was not always possible. As a result, 
American captains employed two defensive wind tactics, wearing and hauling close to 
the wind. Each tactic either negated the weather gage’s advantages or seized it from the 
enemy. Two battles fought during the War of 1812 exemplify these defensive tactics, the 
United States frigate Constitution vs. the British frigate Java for wearing and the United 
States sloop Hornet vs. the British brig Peacock for hauling close to the wind. 
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USS Constitution vs. HMS Java 
 Sailing off Brazil’s coast on the morning of December 29, 1812, the United States 
frigate Constitution, commanded by Commodore William Bainbridge, observed two 
strange sails off his weather bow. However, being at such a great distance, identifying the 
vessels or their course proved impossible. Finally at 10:00 a.m. Commodore Bainbridge 
determined that one ship had spotted the American and started moving away from its 
companions, towards the shore. In the hours that followed, the Constitution hoisted the 
private signal for the day to determine the pursuer’s identity. Answering with the 
incorrect countersignal, Commodore Bainbridge now assumed the ship a British frigate 
and made sail away from the coast to draw the chaser out of neutral Portuguese waters 
and separate it from the rest of its company.
18
 
 The following afternoon, Commodore Bainbridge, thinking his ship far enough 
from shore, ordered the sails taken in, tacked, and stood for the enemy waiting to give 
battle. Twenty minutes later, the engagement began as the HMS Java, which possessed 
the weather gage, rushed toward the Constitution attempting to gain a raking position. 
Commodore Bainbridge deftly avoided this danger by wearing his ship. Both ships 
opened fire with a mixture of grape and round shot. For a little over two hours the frigates 
dueled, both vessels making substantial maneuvers. The Java repeatedly attempted to 
gain a raking position, while the Constitution completed wear after wear to counter each 
move and bringing the vessel’s guns to bear against the enemy.19  
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Firing volley after volley, each ship inflicted damage on the other. At 2:30 p.m. a 
broadside from the Java wounded Commodore Bainbridge and shot away the 
Constitution’s helm, forcing steering to be done below deck by marines with a block and 
tackle.
20
 Nevertheless, the American gun crews inflicted considerably more destruction 
than their British counterparts, felling all the Java’s masts and rigging. With the British 
frigate dead in the water, Commodore Bainbridge, thinking it had struck its colors, 
disengaged and conducted repairs on his own damaged rigging. At 5:25 p.m., the 
Constitution returned to finish off the Java, taking up a raking position on the enemy’s 
bow. Realizing the American’s intentions, the Java immediately struck its colors and 
surrendered.
21
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USS Constitution vs. HMS Java Battle Map 
 
(Graphic obtained from http://www.history.navy.mil/ussconstitution/history.html) 
As described above, note that for each movement made by the Java, the Constitution 
executes a corresponding turn to bring each broadside to bear against the enemy in 
alternating succession. 
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USS Hornet vs. HMS Peacock 
 Fought on February 24, 1813, the battle between the United States sloop Hornet 
and the British brig Peacock represents another tactic, hauling close to the wind, that 
American captains used to neutralize or recover the weather gage. While cruising off 
northern South America’s Demerara River, the Hornet, captained by James Lawrence, 
bore down on an anchored brig. At 3:30 p.m., as the Hornet neared its target, its crew 
“discovered another [vessel] on our weather quarter, edging down for us.”22 
Fifty minutes later, having ascertained the ship moving toward them to be the 
British brig Peacock, Captain Lawrence cleared his ship for action and ordered the pilot 
to “keep close by the wind, if possible, to get the weather gage.”23 By 5:10 p.m., Captain 
Lawrence, seeing that he could obtain the weather gage and gain the tactical advantage,  
tacked into the wind and stood for the enemy, placing the Hornet on a converging course 
with the Peacock. Fifteen minutes later the two ships passed each other and exchanged 
broadsides.
24
 Taking substantial damage, the Peacock attempted to regain the initiative 
by wearing to starboard so as to bring their opposite broadside to bear against the 
American sloop. However, Captain Lawrence anticipated the enemy maneuver and 
executed it first, taking the enemy’s broadside and running the Hornet up on the 
Peacock’s starboard quarter. From its position, the Hornet directed an extremely heavy 
fire on the enemy vessel, receiving the Peacock’s surrender in less than fifteen minutes. 
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A short time later the British sloop sank.
25
 By this time, the anchored ship that the Hornet 
had originally sighted had escaped from the area. 
 
USS Hornet vs. HMS Peacock Battle Map 
 
In the graphic, the USS Hornet is able to out weather the HMS Peacock, meaning it could 
sail closer into the direction of the wind. This in turn allowed the Hornet to obtain the 
weather gage from the Peacock and ultimately win the battle. 
 
Exhibited by the battles fought by the Constitution and Hornet, these two 
defensive tactics designed to counter an enemy that possessed the weather gage highlight 
the importance wind played in each engagement. As demonstrated by the action between 
the USS Constitution and HMS Java, the first tactic described, wearing, allowed the lead 
ship to fire on the pursuing vessel with its broadside guns. To accomplish such a 
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maneuver, the chased ship engaged in a series of successive turns across the enemy’s 
bow, usually targeting the enemy’s rigging and sails with their fire in an attempt to slow 
or disable the advancing enemy ship. If successful, the tactic gave the wearing ship the 
option to either disengage or continue the battle on its own terms. 
The second defensive wind tactic involved sailing close hauled to the wind. 
Employed by the USS Hornet in its fight against the HMS Peacock, the maneuver sought 
to force the enemy ship to give up the weather gage or end the chase all together. 
Completing the strategy required the pursued ship to steer as close as possible to the 
direction the wind was blowing from without losing the ability to sail effectively. This in 
turn restricts the enemy’s possible movements and forces it either to sail a similar course 
to its chase or risk losing the advantage and allowing the targeted ship to control the 
battle or escape. As the Hornet illustrated, if the pursuing enemy is unable to duplicate 
the maneuver it will pass below the chase ship and lose the weather gage. 
Together these two defensive tactics helped the United States Navy to even the 
odds in battles. In addition, engaging in wearing and hauling close to the wind also 
indicated that American captains had a detailed understanding of how the wind affected 
these engagements and their outcomes, which they had accumulated throughout their 
careers at sea, demonstrating the aggressiveness with which they faced the enemy.
26
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Wearing 
 
 
Wearing allows the white ship to fire repeated broadsides on a perusing grey ship through 
repeated turns across the enemy’s bow. 
 
Hauling Close to the Wind 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In graphic 1, the white ship hauls close to the wind forcing the pursuing grey ship to copy 
the white ship’s maneuver and restricting the enemy’s options for attack. 
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If the pursuing grey ship cannot match the maneuver, meaning sail as close or closer to 
the wind’s direction, the white ship can gain the weather gage or escape, portrayed in 
graphic 2. 
2 
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Conclusion 
  
Throughout history, wind has played an incredibly important role in influencing 
sailing and naval warfare by representing the primary engine of movement, determining 
the direction of possible travel, and embodying a dangerous and destructive natural force. 
Together, the wind’s characteristics embodied a critical role in the United States Navy’s 
development, directly affecting battles in its early wars and shaping the tactics utilized to 
complement its captains’ aggressive styles. Such examples as the losses suffered  by the 
frigates President and Essex, the sinking of the sloop Alligator by a tornado, as well as 
the narrow escapes symbolized by the sloop Hornet and frigate Constitution just when 
capture seemed inevitable, all testify to the power and unpredictability that wind as a 
source of friction brought to naval engagements. On the other hand, the celebrated 
victories achieved by the Constellation, Constitution, Hornet, and other United States 
Navy vessels illustrate the significant role that wind tactics, specifically those involving 
the weather gage, performed in ensuring America’s early naval independence. Without 
this tactical understanding of wind that its captains provided, the Navy may well have 
withered in the crucible of its early wars, leaving the United States vulnerable militarily 
and economically. 
 While this paper presents an examination of wind and its influence on the early 
United States Navy, it by no means the story’s end. Instead, more investigation into the 
effects not only of wind, but also other natural forces on historical events, not just 
warfare, is needed in order to understand the environment’s central role in shaping human 
civilization. Only by grasping how mankind interacted with the environment in the past 
83 
can we hope to comprehend how our environment will affect our future wars and way of 
life.
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Glossary of Nautical Terms 
Aground: The situation of a ship when its bottom, or any part of it, rests in the ground 
Bow: The front of a ship. 
Brig: A two masted, square-rigged ship. 
Broadside: A discharge of all the guns on one side of a ship both above and below deck. 
Carronade: A short, smoothbore, cast iron cannon that served as a powerful, short-range 
anti-ship and anti-crew weapon 
Chase: A vessel pursued by another vessel. 
Chaser: The pursuing vessel. 
Close on the Wind (Close Hauled or Hauled): To trim the ship’s sails in order to sail as 
near as possible to the direction from which the wind is blowing. 
Cruiser: (19
th
 century meaning) A classification of ship which goes on independent 
scouting or raiding missions. 
Dead Angle: The position off either stern quarter in which none of the targeted ship’s 
guns can be trained to fire. 
Fore Mast: The mast nearest the bow in all vessels having two or more masts. 
Forecastle: The upper deck of the ship’s frame that lies near the stern. 
Frigate: A square rigged, heavily armed, medium sized warship with either one or two 
armed decks. 
Grape Shot: A cluster of small cast iron or lead balls used primarily as an antipersonnel 
weapon. 
Hawser: A small cable 
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Helm: The instrument by which the ship is steered, and includes both the wheel and the 
tiller, as one general term. 
Hull: The ship’s body. 
Knot: Measurement used to calculation of the ship’s velocity over one nautical mile. 
Launch: A smaller boat carried by a large ship. 
Lee-Quarter: That quarter of a ship that is farthest away from the direction the wind is 
blowing from.  
Main Yard: The lower yard on a mainmast. 
Main Mast: The tallest mast, usually located near the center of the ship. 
Maintop Mast: The top portion of the main mast. 
Mizzen Mast: The third mast or the mast immediately behind the main mast, typically the 
shortest mast on a ship. 
Out-weather: To sail closer to the direction of the wind than an opponent. 
Port Quarter: The back, left part of a ship. 
Powder Magazine: The place on the ship where gunpowder is stored.  
Quarter: One of the four counters of a ship. 
Rake: To carronade a ship at the stern or bow, so that the balls scour the whole length of 
the decks. 
Rigging: The part of the ship that propels a sailing ship through the water, including the 
masts, yards, sails, and cordage.  
Round Shot: A solid projectile without explosive charge, fired from a cannon and used 
primarily to target an enemy’s hull. 
Rudder Braces: Braces used to secure the rudder to the ship. 
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Set All Sail: To unfurl and expand all the ship’s sails to the wind, in order to give 
maximum motion to the ship. 
Sheet Anchor: A large spare anchor used only in emergencies. 
Sheet Cable: The cable attached to the sheet anchor. 
Ship of the Line: A sailing warship armed powerfully enough to serve in the line of 
battle, usually having cannons ranged along two or more decks. 
Sloop: A single-masted, fore-and-aft-rigged sailing vessel, with or without a bowsprit, 
having a jib-headed or gaff mainsail, the latter sometimes with a gaff topsail, and 
one or more headsails. 
Spar: A stout pole such as those used for masts, etc.; a mast, yard, boom, gaff, etc. 
Stand (Standing): To advance in a direction. 
Starboard Quarter: The back, right part of a ship. 
Stern: The rear of a ship. 
Strike Colors: Universally recognized indication of surrender, especially for ships at sea. 
Tack: A heading of a sailing vessel, when sailing close the direction from which the wind 
is blowing. 
Wear (Wearring or Wore): To change a ship’s course from one tack to the other, by 
turning its stern to the wind. 
Weather(ing): To go to windward of anything. 
Weather Beam: The side of the ship on which the wind is blowing. 
Weather Gage: When a ship or fleet is to windward of another, it is said to have the 
weather gage on them. 
Weather Quarter: The quarter of the ship on which the wind is blowing. 
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Windward: the direction from which the wind is blowing. 
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